This paper is concerned with the development of a general theory for the class of multistage linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) decision problems characterized by (i) two decision makers (DM) each with a different objective functional to optimize, (ii) one-step delay observation sharing information pattern which provides each DM with the observation (but not the action) of the other DM with a one-step delay, (iii) a noncooperative equilibrium solution concept. In particular, it is proven that, under certain conditions, this class of optimization problems admit unique equilibrium strategies for each DM, which are linear in the information available. Moreover, exact expressions for those unique strategies are given in the paper. When specialized to the case of a single objective functional, the theory developed generalizes and unifies some of the results found in the literature on dynamic LQG team and zero-sum game problems.
INTRODUCTION
One of the interesting, though mathematically challenging, areas of decision and control theory is derivation and investigation of the properties of equilibrium solutions of multiperson multicriteria stochastic decision problems. These problems are characterized by several decision makers (agents) with decentralized dynamic information, acting on a system and seeking to optimize different objective functionals. What makes this class of optimization problems mathematically challenging is that the standard techniques of stochastic control theory (such as separation principle, dynamic programming) are not in general applicable, and the equilibrium solutions of such problems are in general of quite a different nature than the optimal solutions of single-criteria stochastic control problems.
In this paper, we develop a general theory for the class of multistage linearquadratic decision problems characterized by two decision makers, one-step delay observation sharing pattern, and a noncooperative equilibrium solution concept. In particular, we prove that under certain conditions (which are given in the paper), this class of problems admits unique equilibrium strategies, for each decision maker, which are linear in the information available. Moreover, expressions for those unique strategies are given in the paper. The one-step delay observation sharing pattern, under which uniqueness is established, provides each decision maker with the observation (but not the action) of the other decision maker with a one-step delay. This assumption concerning the information structure of each decision maker is actually necessary to obtain uniqueness, since if either or both decision makers also have access to past actions (i.e., under the one-step delay sharing pattern in Witsenhausen's (1971) terminology), then it can be shown, by resorting to certain nonuniqueness results obtained in Basar (1974b, c) within the context of nonzero-sum dynamic games, that the equilibrium solution is nonunique and can be nonlinear. Further details on this nonuniqueness property of the equilibrium solution under the enlarged information structure can be found in Basar (1976a, b) .
In Section 2, we formulate the general problem in precise mathematical terms, with special emphasis given on delineation of the strategy spaces of each decision maker and the strategy-dependent definition of uniqueness. In Section 3, we quote a key result from Basar (1974a Basar ( , 1975 concerning the equilibrium solution of the single-stage version of the problem, and also we summarize the solution of an auxiliary filtering problem, which are used in the derivation of the solution of the general problem. Section 4 is devoted to derivation and proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium solution of the main problem. The key results of the paper are embedded in this section in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The proof of Theorem 4.1 involves an (inevitably) lengthy and rather intricate induction argument, details of which are provided in Section 7 (Appendix). In Section 5, we specialize the theory developed to the case of a single objective functional, so as to generalize and unify some of the results found in the literature on linear-quadraticGaussian team and zero-sum game problems. Finally in Section 6 we include some closing remarks concerning the nature of the solution, pitfalls of the induction proof, and the significance of the information structure.
FORMULATION OF THE DECISION PROBLEM
In order to properly formulate a multistage decision problem with dynamic information structure, it is necessary that the following information is supplied precisely:
(i) Number of decision makers (DM).
(ii) Number of stages in the decision process.
(iii) Functional description of the dynamical system.
(iv) Information structure for each DM, i.e., delineation of the precise information gained and recalled by each DM at every stage of the decision process.
(v) Control (decision) spaces for each DM.
(vi) Permissible strategies (control laws) for each DM, defined as mappings from information spaces into control spaces.
(vii) Objective functionals.
(viii) An equilibrium solution concept that is mutually consistent for all D1VI.
The decision problem that will be addressed to in this paper involves two DM and N decision stages, where N is a positive integer. Evolution of the decision process is described by a linear stochastic difference equation
x(n + 1) = F(n) x(n) + G~(n) ua(n) + G2(n ) u~(n) -/v(n);
(2.1) *(0) = x0, where x(n) denotes the p-dimensional state vector at stage n, and ui(n) denotes the r~-dimensional decision variable of DMi at stage n. F('), GI('), and Gz(-) are matrices of appropriate dimensions and are defined for each n e 0 ~ {0, I ..... N --1}. The sequence {v(n), n e 0} describes a zero-mean Gaussian white noise process with a covariance function E[v(n)vr(h)] = ¢(n)8n~ for all n, k e 0.
The initial state vector x o is also a Gaussian random vector, statistically independent of the sequence {v(-)}, and with mean ~7 0 and covariance Q.
Information Structure
At stage n, DB/fl (i) observes x(n) linearly in additive Gaussian noise and (ii) has perfect access to D1Vf2's observation at stage n-1. Likewise, at stage n DM2 (i) makes an independent linear observation of x(n) in additive Gaussian noise and (ii) has access through a perfect channel to what D1Vfl has observed at the previous stage. The noisy state observation of DM1 and DM2 will be denoted, respectively, by the m 1-and m2-dimensional vectors zl(n ) and z2(n), at stage n, where
Here //1(" ) and Ha(" ) are matrices of appropriate dimensions defined for all n E O, and the sequences {wl(n), n ~ 0}, {w2(n), n ~ O} are statistically independent zero-mean Gaussian white noise processes with covariance functions Now, let Z~ denote the complete set of observations made by both DN[ up to (and including) stage n, i.e., Z~ = {zl(0), z2(0),..., zl(n), zz(n)}.
(2.3) Then, the dynamic information that is known to (and can be utilized by) DMI and DM2 at stage n can be expressed in terms of Z~_ 1 , respectively, as follows:
We will call this kind of information structure for each DM the one step delay observation sharing pattern. Note that this is different than the "one-step delay sharing pattern" introduced earlier by Witsenhausen (1971) , since the former does not include any information on the control values.
Decision Spaces and Strategies
Letting R r~ denote the m-dimensional real Euclidean space and ~ the Borel field generated by its subsets, we assume the decision spaces of DM1 and DM2 to be (Rn, ~1) and (R% ~), respectively. Furthermore, the decision law 7i n of DMi at stage n is a real-vector-valued Borel-measurable function on (R ~*", ~*"), mapping this observation space into (R% ~r~), where mi ~ z~ mi + n(ma + m~). As in the static case discussed by Ba,sar (1975) , we will impose a finite norm restriction on the decision laws at each stage. But since the information structure is of dynamic nature, this can only be done recursively as follows:
Stage O. Since the information structure is static here, we will assume 7j°(~j °) to possess a finite second-order moment under the Gaussian probability measure ~,o, that is O'Oi°:[fR oT
Here ~,0 denotes the probability measure induced on 5~ ~ by the random vector zi(O), and P,o denotes the corresponding distribution function. We now denote the space of all equivalence classes of Borel functions that satisfy the finite norm restriction (2.5a) by ~o. ~or, o is a Banach space.
Stage 1. The information vectors ~h 1 and ~7~ 1 at this stage are dependent on the decision laws employed in the previous stage. Since every 71 ° and 72 o in ~o~o and ~r'~ °, respectively, is a Borel function, ~?i 1 is a well-defined random vector on (R m~, ~,ni), but the probability measure induced by ~?i 1 on ~? will be dependent on ?t ° and 72 o and will not necessarily be Gaussian. To indicate this dependence explicitly, we will denote the probability measure induced by ~?i 1 by ~,. We first note that the random vector zi(1) is linear in y 0(~ 0) and 7~°(% °) and since the random variables that it depends on have finite second-order moments, the probability measure ~1 has finite second-order moments for every 71 ° e ~,o~,, 7~ o e ~a~'~ °. Now, we assume ),il(~il) to possess a finite secondorder moment under the probability measure ~,~,, that is, It should be noted that the norm introduced above is inevitably dependent on the decisions made at the previous stage. Hence, for each pair (71 °, y2 °) we denote the space of all equivalence classes of Borel functions yi 1 that satisfy (2.6) by £a~(70). It should be clear that for every fixed y o e ~<~r,~ ° and y0 e ~,a,~o, oga~i~,.~, t r0xj is a Banach space. Permissible strategy spaces of the decision makers at subsequent stages can likewise be defined. An appropriate definition for stage n (n e 0) would be as follows:
Stage n. The information vectors ~71 '~ and ~2 ~ are dependent on the decision laws employed in the previous stages. Furthermore, ~?i n is a well-defined random vector on (R m~, ~) and possesses finite second-order moments. Let us denote
the sequence of Borel functions {yl °, 7~ °, 711, 721,..., 71 ,7~-1} by and the n yn --i probability measure induced by ~7i n on ~ by ~,# . Then the decision laws yl ~ and 7fl * to be picked at this stage are assumed to satisfy the finite norm restriction fR T n-i 11/2
We denote the space of equivalence classes of all such Borel functions ),i n by S'i~A,n-l~ for each permissible sequence of strategies" 7n-1. S~ r.2(7~-1) is" a
Banach space for every fixed{yi°~ ~r** , Y2 °E _w%o ~, i = c/g, lV^,i-lx ^, i = 50%~(,~/-1"t i = l, 2,..., n}.
Objective Functionals
The quadratic objective (cost) functionals of DM1 and DM2 are denoted by J1 ° and j0, respectively, and are defined by the following expressions: Dij(n ) ~ 0 are real-valued matrices defined for all n e O, i,j = 1, 2, and ui~ z~ {ui(m),... ' ui(N _ 1)}, _u2 *" A {u2(m),..., u2 (N --1) ).
• ~,£a,~t-i-i~ ~, i ~ ~ga~%,i-i~ i --l 2,.., N°w , f°r a n v (~°~£ a~*°,~°~°, 7 i *~ __ .~ ~ ~r ),r2 ~2 ~ ~' --' N --1}, the expected (average) cost for DMi is given by Now, most of the remaining parts of the paper will be devoted to verification of the existence of a unique globally optimal equilibrium solution for the decision problem under consideration and derivation of the corresponding strategies for each DM. In doing that we shall also make use of a weaker equilibrium solution concept called a "stagewise optimal solution" which is defined below: inequalities and by definition they are all satisfied by a globally optimal equilibrium solution. This implies that a globally optimal equilibrium solution is necessarily also a stagewise optimal solution but not vice versa. Furthermore when we talk about a "unique" stagewise optimal solution we will mean it in the sense of Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. This completes the formulation of the multistage multicriteria decision problem to be solved in this paper. In the next section we will first give a summary of some of the results obtained by Basar (1975) concerning a single-stage version of the problem. These results will be utilized in obtaining the unique solution of the multistage problem. Consideration of the concept of stagewise optimality actually allows us to convert the N-stage decision problem with dynamic information into N single-stage decision problems with static information, equilibrium solutions of which are equivalent to stagewise optimal solutions of the former, provided that the dynamic nature of the information structure, and the interrelations and functional dependences among the Nsingle-stage decision problems are carefully taken into account. Once this is done, the next step then would be to verify global optimality of the unique stagewise optimal solution.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section we first give the solution of a single-stage version of the general problem, which will be used in subsequent sections of the paper. We then give another useful result concerning the conditional mean of the state vector under the common information available to both I)M's.
A Single-Stage Version of the Decision Problem
Let us now consider a static decision problem characterized by the objective functionals
and the observation vectors
Here x, wl, and w 2 are statistically independent Gaussian vectors of appropriate dimensions, with x ~-~ N(~, Q), w~ ~ N(0, R~), Q ~ 0, R~ > 0, i = 1, 2, and u and v are the decision variables of DM1 and DM2, respectively. If we denote by 7~ the decision law of DMi and by ~z~ and ~ the appropriate Banach spaces of control laws, in accordance with the formulation of Section 2, then we can quote the following theorem from Ba,sar (t974a, 1975) : Ba,sar (1974a Ba,sar ( , 1975 ]. of any bounded real symmetric matrix ArA. Then, if either
the decision problem posed above admits a unique equilibrium solution {~,1" ~ S¢~, 78* ~ Xe~22} which satisfies the pair of equations
Let )t( A) denote the maximum eigenvalue and is given in closed form by 7i*(zi) = A i 2 4 -B i ( z i --H i x )
(3.5)
where
B 1 is given as the unique solution of the Lyapunov-type equation
M ~ --D~CIQH~r(H~QHI ~ 4-R~) -~ 4-D~DIeD~CeQHf(HeQHf 4-Re)-aHeQHIT(H~QH~ ~ 4-R~) -~ (3.7d) and Be is given by Be = --D~I[Cz 4-De~BxH~] QHer(HeQHe r 4-Re) -~.
(3.8)
An Optimal Fihering Problem
The second auxiliary result that we shall need in the sequel is an expression for the mean of the state vector at every stage conditioned on the common information available to the DMs and for any fixed sequence of decision laws {yi °, 7il,..., 7~ v-l} in ~.
That is, using the notation of Section 2, the problem is to determine
whenever x(') is given by the difference equation
for some sequence c 0 N-I~ ~7~,'",Yi ~i n~, i = 1,2. The solution to this problem can easily be obtained by a straightforward application of Kalman filtering theory once we formulate it within the right framework. To this end, we first obtain a recursive equation for
(3.9c) and then express letting for each n ~ 0 ~(n) in terms of k(n-1) via a one-step predictor. Now,
, e(n) zx G~(n) yln(~, ") + G2(n ) y n(%n),
we have the following lemma by direct application of the results from Kalman (1963) :
LEMMA 3.1. For the optimal filtering problem posed above, the conditional estimate ~(') is given by
where ~(n) is defined recursively by
MAIN RESULTS
Now, we address ourselves first to existence of a unique stagewise optimal solution for the general decision problem posed in Section 2, and then to verification of global optimality of the derived solution.
Let {91", Y2*} denote any stagewise optimal solution for the decision problem. Then, by Definition 2.4, it has to satisfy the 2N inequalities (2.12). In order to investigate the properties and the functional structure of any permissible decision law sequence that might satisfy these inequalities, let us first start with n = N-1 and further proceed in a descending order. If we rewrite the relevant pair of inequalities for n = N --1, we have minimize the right-hand side (RHS) of (4.1a) over ~ ( y ) and should minimize the RHS of (4.1b) over ~c~r~f-*(*yN-2 ). Now, since ]i(91,92) can also be rewritten as
and since the second term [j0(., .) _ jN-~(., .)] is functionally independent of both Ul(N-1) and u~(N--1), the two minimization problems mentioned above can equivalently be defined through the following inequalities:
Therefore, in determining the optimal structure of the decision laws y~v-, and y~v2-* we can, without any loss of generality, consider the single-stage decision problem defined through (4.3a) and (4.3b) below, together with the inequalities (4.2a) and (4.2b):
The reason why we write x*(N --1) instead of x(N --1) is to indicate that the state vector at n = N --1 is dependent on the previously selected decision laws {*yx-2} and thus its probability measure is determined by those decision laws. Consequently the probability measure induced by Hence, if the N --1 pairs of stagewise optimal decisions {*y zv-2} at the previous stages have already been determined, then to obtain the stagewise optimal decision pair at the final stage one has basically to solve the following single-stage decision problem. 
Auxiliary Problem

Solution to Auxiliary Problem 4.1
If we substitute (4.3b) into (4.3a) and multiply out the quadratic terms, then we observe that the preceding decision problem is equivalent to the single-stage decision problem of Section 3.1, with the only differences being (i) the appearance of the extra terms involving v(N --1) in the cost function (4.3a), and (ii) x*(N--1) not being necessarily Gaussian. However, both of these difficulties can easily be handled as follows: First of all, since v ( N -1) is statistically independent of all the other random vectors and has zero mean, its appearance does not affect the solution at all. Moreover, since (4.4) can also be written as first conditioned on ZN_ ~ and then the full averaging, what becomes important is the probability distribution of x*(N --1) conditioned on ZN_Z • But this is known to be Gaussian with mean ~( N -1) and covariance L ( N --2 ) . This then makes auxiliary problem 4.1 equivalent to the problem of Section 3.1, and hence the following result (Lemma 4.1) follows directly from Theorem 3.1. where
Preliminary notation. ~,~ z~ G f ( N -
i=/=j,i,j= 1,2, (4.8) and Bf -~ is given as the unique solution of the Lyapunov-type equation be noted at this pomt that as a mapping between (R ~ , ~ ~ ) and (R 4, ~,~) the structure of the optimal decision rule "7~ v-a as given by (4.7) depends on the decision laws picked at previous stages. That is, in order to be able to say
whether "7~-107~ -i) is linear in r~f -1 or not, we definitely have to know the structure of the previous decision laws. But this information is not available ahead of time because of the very nature of the problem; moreover in order to be able to determine the optimal structure of the previous decision laws, we have to know the optimal structure of the last-stage decision so that a recursive procedure can work. Now, in order to resolve this dilemma, we make the following crucial observation:
The functional dependence of ,y~v-l(~-l) on zi(N-1) is independent of the previous decision rules, and this property of the optimal solution at stage N --1 is sufficient for the recursive procedure to work. We thus have: 
Now, before we attempt to perform the optimization with respect to 7~ -~ and 7~ -2, we have to express f~-~ and fN-2 in terms of y~ r-~ and y~-~, explicitly. jv~_~ is definitely a function of *y~ r-~ and *72 w-~ which are known to be equilibrium solutions, but quite arbitrary otherwise. However, by the Corollary to 
4-½_/r(N --1) 0~(N --1)/(N --1) @ ~q(N --1); (4.15a)
Oi(]~ --1) = Ci(N --1) ~-[F(N --l) @ G~(N --1) BN-~H~(N --1)
4-G2(N --1) B~-aHz(N --1)] T. Ci(N)[F( N _
1
!(N -1) £ [(g-lT, (g-1)T; (4.15c) -([AN-~)r G~ ~(N--1)C~(N)[F(N--l) + Ga(N--I )BN-~H~(N -1) 1
+C~(N--1)B~-~H~(N--I)] +(AT ~)~D~:(N--1)B~-~H~(N--1) ( A N-~) TG2 r(N--1)C,( N)[F( N--1 ) + G~( N--1)Bi~-*H~( N -1) + G2(N--1)
• Bg-aHz(N -1)] q-(~4 N-~) TD,2 (X--1 )Bg-~Hz(N -1) (4.15d) d.(N-1) "(z{N-1)r[Glr(N--1)Ci(N--I)GI(N--1) (A~-a)rGtr(N--1)C~(N--1) ]
+D~a(N--1)]AN-~ " G'~(N--1)AN-~ ! l;
(A~-~)rGJ(N--1)C~(N--1) ('4~-~)r[G~r(N--1)CdN--1) ]
• G~(N--1)~/~ -~
• G2(N--1)+D~(N--1)]~iN-~J
(4.15e)
(4.15f)
Hence, in order to determine the optimal structure of the decision rules ~,~-~ and N-2 Y~ , we have to solve a static two-person two-criteria decision problem that is similar to the auxiliary problem 4.1, and consequencely its solution will be of the same nature, but with one important additional feature. This time, we also have to determine the relation between the solution found and the arbitrarily picked functions l N-1 and l N-2, and further extend this relation to other stages. In the sequel, we will accomplish this through an inductive argument, i.e., (i) we will assume a quadratic structure for the cost functions at stage n @ 1, (ii) we will determine the optimal solution under this quadratic structure, (iii) we will make use of the equilibrium consistency condition to obtain expressions in closed form, and finally (iv) we will verify that the single-stage decision problem is of the same nature (with n @ 1 replaced by n). Details of this inductive argument are given in the Appendix, and it leads us to the important Theorem 4.1.
Preliminary notation. New terms and notation used in Theorem 4.1 (unless otherwise stated, i =/=j, and i,j = l, 2):
B1 ~ is an (rl × n)-dimensional matrix that solves uniquely the following Lyapunov-type matrix equation:
and L(') is given by (3.12@ Furthermore,
Ci('), Cij('), and C~i(') are matrices of dimensions p × p, p × (ra @ r2), and (r 1 ~-r2)× (r, @ r2), respectively, and are defined through the following difference equations: 
+U(~) dij(~ +
where K(') is given by (3.12b) and H(.) by (3.10a); (ii) For each n ~ 0, the square matrices/311(n ) and/32z(n ) are invertible.
(iii) For each n 6 0, at least one of the following two inequalities is satisfied (here A(A) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of any bounded real symmetric matrix drA): 
and with
where ~*(') is given by (3.12a) with e(') replaced by e*('), and it denotes the conditional mean of the state vector x(') given the common state information and the calculated equilibrium values of the past decision rules.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It is provided in the Appendix.
COROLLARY TO THEOREM 4.1. The unique optimal solution for the multistage decision problem is linear in the dynamic information available to each DM; i.e., it is possible to find appropriate dimensional matrices {A~(j, h)} and vectors {A~(k)} such that for each n ~ 0 we have
and this representation is unique in terms of the coefficient matrices, and vectors {A~(k)}.
Proof of the Corollary. This result follows readily from the recursive Kahnan filter equations given by Lemma 3.1. The matrices {Ai(j, k)} and vectors {A~(k)} can in fact be explicitly determined as functions of the parameters of the decision problem.
Since the decision laws (4.27) constitute a stagewise optimal solution, they satisfy the pair of inequalities (2.12) for each n ~ 0. Now, the optimality of these decision laws can even be strengthened by verifying that they also satisfy the original inequalities (2.10), that is, the pair (4.27) is a globally optimal equilibrium solution. This verification can be accomplished by resorting to certain standard results of stochastic control theory. Proof of Theorem 4.2. In order to prove the desired result it will be sufficient to show that the decision law sequence {*yl ~} minimizes the objective functional jvl(9l, ~=*) and {'72 ~} minimizes J2(~1", 9z), because then uniqueness follows directly from Theorem 4.1 since every globally optimal equilibrium solution is, by definition, also a stagewise optimal solution.
The first minimization problem that we referred to above can be formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem as follows: Starting with the expression of "72~(') as given by (4.29b) and substituting this into the state equation (2.1) for ue('), we have
and substitution of the same expression into the cost functional (2.8a) further yields L( I,
+ 2[xr(n)H2T(n)Azr(2, n) + A2r(n)]D,2(n)T.(z) + T.r(z)D~z(n)T~(z)}]
+ Tr ~ D~2(n ) A2(2, n) R2(n ) A2r(2, n) , (4.30b) 2 n--1
T~(z) A= Z ~ A2(j, k)zj(k).
(4.30c) j=l 7c=0
Equations (4.30a) and (4.30b) now define a generalized linear quadratic stochastic control problem together with the classical information structure (3.10b). Since
Tn(z) is only a function of {zl (0), z2(0),..., z2(N --1)} for each n ~ 0, it is measurable with respect to the information field at every n ~ 0. Furthermore, since Tn(z) enters the state equation linearly and the objective function quadratically, Jz(71, ~z*) is a strictly convex function of {ul(n), n ~ 0} and the classical separation theorem of stochastic optimum control applies (Witsenhausen, 1971) . Every minimizing solution of this problem can thus be obtained via dynamic programming, and this implies that inequalities (2.12a) necessarily imply inequality (2.10a). It should be clear that a similar reasoning verifies the equivalence of (2.12b) and (2.10b) for the decision problem under consideration. This completes the proof of the statement that (4.27a)-(4.27b) satisfy inequalities (2.10) uniquely.
Remark 4.1. In the formulation of the multistage decision problem in Section 2, we assumed the matrices Dl~(n ) and D21(n ) to be positive definite for all n E 0. However, we can actually relax this severe restriction since the only place where we made use of this positive definiteness requirement was in the proof of Theorem 4.2 above in establishing the convexity of the cost functionals ]1(71,72") and J2(71", 72). We note that Theorem 4.1 will still be valid if DI~(') and D21 (-) are taken to be arbitrary square matrices of appropriate dimensions. Hence, for the purpose of gaining generality, we can assume f1(71,72") to be convex in {ul(n), n ~ 0} and ]2(71,72") to be convex in {u~(n), n ~ 0} to replace Dl~(n ) > O, D21(n ) > O, n ~ O.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF A SINGLE OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONAL
One special (but general enough) version of the multistage decision problem of Section 2 is the case when the two objective functionals are equivalent, or in other words, when the decision makers have a single objective functional to optimize. The decision problem is then known as a LQG team problem and its globally optimal solution is known as a team optimal solution. For this special case, our definition of an equilibrium solution (Definition 2.1) leads in general to person-by-person optimality which coincides with team optimality if the cost function satisfies the right convexity conditions. Let us now consider the LQG team problem defined as in the formulation of Section 2, but with a single cost functional J(', ") ~ Jl°( ", '), where the latter is defined by (2.8a). Concerning the team solution of this problem, the following result easily follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It readily follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 that, for this sepcial case, the strategies given in Theorem 4.1 constitute a unique person-by-person optimal solution. Furthermore, since dr( -, .) is strictly convex in the pair {-u~ -l, -2uN-I~, and since every team optimal solution is by definition also person-by-person optimal, the result easily follows.
Remark 5.1. Theorem 5.1 states that the team optimal solution is unique under the one-step delay observation sharing pattern. At this point one might ask the question, as to whether other (new and better) team optimal solutions emerge if we inciude knowledge of the past actions in the information structure. We now argue that, since we have a single-criterion problem, under the amended information pattern it is not possible to produce solutions that are better (i.e., yield a lower average value for the cost function) than the solution given in Theorem 5.1.
Let us assume to the contrary for the moment, that is, there exists a pair of strategies under the amended information structure that yields a lower average value for the cost function. However, because of causality, this solution can uniquely be expressed in terms of only the relevant observation vectors, and this constitutes a contradiction with the global optimality of the solution of Theorem 5.1 under the original information structure. Hence, by including knowledge of the previous actions in the information pattern, the value of the cost function cannot be lowered any further in a team problem, and one can, without any loss of generality, deal with the original information structure.
Remarh 5.2. Optimality of an affine unique team solution for the LQG dynamic team problem and under the one-step delay sharing pattern has earlier been asserted in Witsenhausen (1971) and proven in Ho and Chu (1972) . Exact expressions for the unique solution, however, were obtained later quite independently and using different methods by Kurtaran and Sivan (1974) , Sandell and Athans (1974), and Yoshikawa (1975) .
Another extreme case of the class of multicriteria decision problems considered in this paper would be the situation when Jl(', ")~ -J2(', "), that is a zero-sum dynamic game in which DM1 is minimizer, DM2 the maximizer, and the objective functional is J =-. [1(', ") . Definitely, in this case, we have to remove the positive-definiteness requirements on certain matrices in the cost functions; but, nevertheless, one can show that, if the equivalence relations
hold for some ]3 > 0, and if J(ul, P2*) and J(~l*, u~) are, respectively, strictly convex in u 1 and strictly concave in u2, then the solution {~1", P2*} given in Theorem 4.1 provides a unique saddle point pair for the zero-sum dynamic game posed above.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main results of this paper are embedded in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 which state that the class of multistage LQG decision problems characterized by two decision makers and a one-step delay observation sharing pattern admit unique affine noncooperative equilibrium solutions. The exact expressions given in Theorem 4.1 indicate that the unique optimal policy of DMi at stage n is a linear mapping on his current observation zi(n) plus a linear mapping on ~*(n), where ~*(n) denotes the conditional mean of x(n) given the common observation data of the players and under the calculated equilibrium decision rules at previous stages. Since ~:*(n) is not directly available to the decision makers, a mathematically more precise way of expressing the optimal decision rules is to write them in the structural form given in the Corollary to Theorem 4.1. We note, however, that if each DM were also given the past actions of the other DM, then a policy of the form r?(n, ~) = A,~C(n) + B,~[~,(n) -H,(n) 8(n)] (6.1)
would be permissible for DMi, but the optimal coefficient matrices would then be different than those given in Theorem 4.1. This difference is mainly due to the fact that ~:(n) used in (6.1) above is directly a function of the past decision rules, while ~*(n) used in Theorem 4.1 depends on the past decision rules only through the past observations. Moreover, as it has been pointed out in Section 1 and in more detail in Basar (1976b) , the equilibrium solution obtained under the structural form (6.1) would be one out of uncountably many different equilibrium solutions obtainable under the one-step delay information sharing pattern. For the dynamic team problem of Section 5, however, such problems definitely do not arise. In obtaining the desired uniqueness result under the one-step delay observation sharing pattern, and in the actual derivation of the corresponding strategies, we have adopted an approach that leads to solving a series of static decision problems, by carefully taking into account the functional links between two consecutive static problems. If the information structure had been the one-step delay sharing pattern and if the strategies had been fixed at the structural form (6.1), then it would be possible to directly extend the procedure of Sandell and Athans (1974) developed for the team problem, and thus determine the functional link between two consecutive static problems rather easily. However, by the very nature of the one-step delay observation sharing pattern, ~:(n) is not directly available at stage n, and hence the above mentioned standard procedure is not valid for this problem. This then leads, by necessity, to the rather intricate induction argument given in Sections 4 and 7. To illustrate the difference between the standard induction argument and the one given in this paper, the reader is especially refered to the argument leading from Lemma 7.1 to Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3.
As a final remark, it should be mentioned that if the information structure of the multicriteria LQG decision problem is characterized by an n-step delay observation sharing pattern with n/> 2, then the problem will, in general, admit nonlinear equilibrium solutions, as it has earlier been shown by Witsenhausen (1968) for the special case of a team problem. It is also well known that for the special case of a zero-sum game, a two-step delay observation sharing pattern might still lead to unique linear equilibrium solutions (Basar and Mintz (1972) ).
APPENDIX
In this appendix we provide a proof for Theorem 4.1 of Section 4. Starting with the definition of a stagewise optimal solution as given by (2.12), let us first write those inequalities for stage n -t- .~( N -1) = vf-l(.)], (7.2) and since [j0(., .) _ j~+l(., .)] is independent of both ul(n q-1) and us(n @ 1), E~e4 ( 7 ) , (7.1a ) and (7.1b) can equivalently be written as follows for all y~ +l "'°+~ * ~ n+l ~+i , n .
7a~+lt, ,+1 ,7~+1) ~,+l. ,+l ,7~+1), Now, let us assume that the decision laws {'71 k, "78 k, k = N --1, N --2,..., n -1-2} are as given in Theorem 4.1. Then inequalities (7.3a)-(7.3b) define a static quadratic decision problem which is assumed to admit a unique solution under the conditions of Theorem 4.1 and in the form 3~+iln+atY ~ (7.5a)
where e~ +x is given by (4.20) and l~ +~ is an element of the Banach space 5¢z-(*y ~-1) and is defined at equilibrium as follows:
Now, we assume that if the decision law sequence {'71 ~, "72 ~, k = N --1 ..... n q-2} is as given by Theorem 4.1, and if {'7~ +1, *73 +1} is in the structural form (7.5a), then substitution of these expressions into ]~+1 and taking expectation with respect to the statistics of {v (N-1) ,..., v(n q-1), wl (N --1) ..... wl(n -}-1), w2 (N --1) ,..., w2(n 4-1)} yields the following expres-^ sion (to be denoted by ]~+1) which corresponds to (4.15a): and is defined at equilibrium by (7.5b).
To sum up, we have so far made the following assumptions: ASSUMPTION 1. Theorem 4.1 is valid for stages (N-i) to (n q-2), and at stage n + 1 the equilibrium solution of the single-stage decision problem is given uniquely by (7.4) and under the existence conditions of Theorem 4.1. Consequently, in investigating the equilibrium solution at stage (n + 1), we can, without any loss of generality, restrict ourselves to expressions (7.5a). ASSUMPTION 2. Under this equilibrium solution and with If +z, o21~+1 taken as arbitrary elements of appropriate Banach spaces, the expected (average) cost ^ function jrg+l at stage n + 1 can be written as in (7.6). Now, under these two assumptions, we will determine the equilibrium solution of the single-stage decision problem at stage n and verify that its features are identical to the ones given above with only n q-1 replaced by n. Since these assumptions are already valid for n = N --1 (Section 4), this will conclude the proof of the Theorem.
To determine the equilibrium solutions at stage n, we first start with inequalities (2.12) and following the reasoning that led from (7.1) to (7.3), we can write down the equivalent set of inequalities jtn(*71 ~, "7~ n) <~ j1~(71 ~, "72~); (7.8a) ]2"(*~'1", *~'~") ~ ]2"(*~'1", 72"); (7.8b) ~n,"t* .... 1~ i = 1, 2. Here ]i n is defined by (7.3c) with n @ 1 to hold for all~i "e ~t r J, replaced by n, or equivalently (as in the ease of (4.14)) by ]i" = E [~i"(u_~ ~, u_~") 
Substitution of (7.6) into (7.9b) further yields
Here all vectors and matrices assume their values at stage n, unless otherwise noted, that is u z A uz(n), uz A u2(n), Da A Dil(n) ..... Furthermore, we use star as a super index for x A x(n) in order to emphasize its dependence on the decision laws {.7~-1}. Hence, the probability measure induced by x* is not necessarily Gaussian, though since each "7i ~ is in" ~ivi e(,Te-1) for {i = 1, 2, k -~ 0,..., n --1}, x* is a second-order random variable. While considering inequalities (7.8) we further note that (i) the cost functions (7.9c) are quadratic in u a and u2, (ii) since the observation vectors are linear in the state, Bi n has finite second-order moments and by hypothesis l~+l(Z~) is also a second-order random vector, and (iiD ~e'~"t*~,~-l~ are Banach spaces. Consequently, for the static decision problem
at stage n defined by inequalities (7.8), we can write down an equation similar to (3.4) for the optimal solutions to satisfy. This is done below in Lemma 7.1.
Preliminary notation.
Dii zx Dis
where Ai '~ is defined by (4.20). Proof of Lemma 7.1. Condition 7.1 guarantees that ]n and ]~ are strictly convex in ul(n ) and u2(n ), respectively. Furthermore, v(n) is a zero-mean random vector which is statistically independent of all the other relevant random variables. Consequently, Lemma 7.1 follows from standard results of stochastic optimum control theory. Now, in order to solve for ),i n from (7.12) we have to make use of the expression for ](n -]-1) at equilibrium as given by (7.7) and (7.5b). After substituting (7.7) into (7.12), we observe that the optimal "7i ~ should satisfy the following relations: In writing down (7.13), we have actually made use of relation (3.11) and the property E[N*(n)]~,~] ~ E[x*(n)]w~]. We now note that the probability distribution function of x*(n) conditioned on Z~_ 1 is Gaussian with mean ~*(n) and covariance L(n-1). Consequently, excluding a difference in notation, Eqs. (7.13) and (3.4) are equivalent and therefore as a direct application of Theorem 3.1 we can quote the following result (Lemma 7.2):
CONDITION 7.2. /)n(n) and/)22(n) are invertible, i.e., det[/),(n)] =/=0, i ----1, 2. where l~" is an element of the Banach space c~z,_l ( .7,-2) and is defined at equilibrium by *li~(Z,_l) = ~*(n), i = 1, 2. (7.18b) Now, as a final step in the verification of the validity of Assumptions 1 and 2 (or equivalently of Theorem 4.1), let us take the decision laws {'71 ~, *Tz k, k = N --1 .... , n + 1} as given in Theorem 4.1 and { 71 , *72"} as given above by (7.18a), and under these strategies let us evaluate the expected value of J # with respect to the statistics of {v (N --1) ,..., v(n), w, (N --1) ,..., wl(n), w2 (N --1) ..... we(n)}. Denoting this averaging operation by E,['], we thus seek to determine ^ J-i n E r ? , r u , = -La, ,-1 , _u2") ] ul(n) = *71~('), u2(n) = "7~(')] (7.19)
where J~-(., -) is as defined by (7.9b). To that end we first evaluate x(n + 1) and I"+V'~ i = 1, 2, when "71n(') and "72n(") are as given by (7.18a):
x(n + 1) = P(n) x(n) + al(n) A?f?(-) + a2(n) &%"(') + a~(n) B?~l(n)
- [-G2(n) B~"w2(n) + v(n), (7.20a) 17+~(.) = F(n) K(n) 4n) + al(n) Bl%(n) + a~(n) B2"~(n) + [F(nV --K(n) H(n)] + a~(n) A~"] l,~(.) + C~(n) A¢I~"(.)
: P(n) x(n) + ¢.(n) l?(') + ~;(~) l?(') + ~w~(n) + ~wj(n), i @ j , i , j = 1,2, (7.20b) where/~(n),/?(n),/~i~, G~i(n), and G~(n) are given by (4.25a), (4.25b), (4.25e), Ji , and after (4.25g), and (4.25h), respectivelv. Then, we substitute ( where Ci('), ~ij('), and Cii(') are defined by (4.22), (4.23), and (4.24), respectively, and ~oi(') denotes the sum of all the additional terms which are independent of x(i), i = n,..., O, and _/('). Since goi(. ) does not affect the solution, its exact expression will not be needed here.
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1, let us now make the following comparisons:
(i) (7.4) with (7.17);
(ii) (7.5b) with (7.18b); (iii) (7.6) with (7.21).
These indicate that Assumptions 1 and 2 made at stage n @ i are equally valid at stage n. But since we had already verified those assumptions at stage N--1 (see Section 4), this completes the proof of Theorem 4.1 by induction.
